





















































Nowhere.	Furthermore,	Gardner	notices	that	for	Nietzsche,	the	practical	perspective	requires	the	presupposition	of	a	self	thus	providing	further	support	for	interpreting	Nietzsche	as	holding	(Practical).	Perhaps	the	clearest	evidence	 for	Nietzsche’s	priority	of	 the	practical	perspective	comes	from	the	last	section	of	the	Genealogy.		There,	Nietzsche	refers	to	the	human	need	for	meaning	or	purpose	and	relates	this	need	to	religious	answers	that	end	up	satisfying	the	 need	 only	minimally.	 	 The	Genealogy	would	 end	 on	 a	 very	 different	 note	 if	 it	were	urging	 us	 to	 focus	 on	 science.	 	 Instead,	 it	 seems	 to	 take	 on	 a	 practical	 perspective	 by	mentioning	how	an	“interpretation	[of	suffering]…		brought	new	suffering	with	it”	while																																																									52	Gardner,	20.	53	See	for	example,	“…	the	naturalistic	model,	though	it	coheres	with	Nietzsche’s	denial	of	the	reality	of	the	I,	conflicts	with	his	practical	presupposition	of	the	self,	and	more	generally	frustrates	the	ambitions	of	Nietzsche’s	practical	thought…”	(Gardner,	21)	
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insinuating	 that	 an	 alternative	 interpretation	 could	 satisfy	 the	 demand	 for	 meaning.54		This	problem	of	meaning	that	Nietzsche	is	concerned	with	is	not	a	problem	at	all	from	the	third	person	theoretical	point	of	view.		Indeed	Nietzsche	seems	to	be	finishing	a	book	that	often	emphasizes	the	theoretical	perspective	by	pointing	out	 that	 it	 is	unsatisfying	 from	the	 practical	 point	 of	 view.55	Unlike	 Risse	 who	 does	 not	 focus	 much	 on	 Nietzsche’s	practical	claims,	Gardner	argues	that	a	reductionist	view	like	Hume’s	or	Parfit’s,	without	a	conception	 of	 a	 unified	 self,	 is	 not	 open	 to	 someone	 with	 Nietzsche’s	 practical	commitments.	Though	Nietzsche	makes	many	 remarks	 that	point	 toward	a	 reductionist	view,	the	fact	that	Nietzsche	takes	the	need	for	meaning	seriously	in	the	last	section	of	the	Genealogy	(and	doesn’t	just	explain	it	away)	is	hard	to	make	sense	within	a	reductionist	view.56			As	we	have	seen	above,	some	of	Nietzsche’s	remarks	that	may	seem	to	contradict	the	self-constitution	view	are	not	really	in	contradiction	if	they	are	coming	from	the	perspective	of	third	person	theoretical	philosophy.		But	in	addition,	we	have	seen	that	Nietzsche	sometimes	emphasizes	the	first	person	practical	perspective	over	the	third																																																									54	GM	III:28.	55	On	this	point,	see:	“Nietzsche	concludes	the	Genealogy	with	the	affirmation	that	we	have	a	need	which	points	beyond	nature	and	which	renders	a	non-naturalistic	self	conception	inescapable	for	us;	there	is	therefore	within	the	Genealogy,	on	the	face	of	it,	a	transition	of	its	terms	of	explanation	from	the	naturalist	of	the	First	and	Second	essays	to	the	concluding	recognition	of	a	trans-natural	perspective	on	the	Third.”	(Gardner,	26)	56	Gardner	emphasizes	how	the	explanation	for	the	need	for	meaning	is	not	enough	to	make	sense	of	Nietzsche’s	view:	“If	Nietzsche	were	to	be	a	consistent	naturalist,	then	he	would	have	to	agree	that	the	need	for	Sinn	can	be	explained	as	some	kind	of	evolutionary	or	whatever	Nebenwirkung,	to	be	resolved	back	into	a	naturalized,	mechanistic,	hedonistic	psychology.	But	-	if	naturalization	of	the	need	for	Sinn	were	to	have	the	meaning	for	Nietzsche	that	it	has	for	the	consistent	naturalist	–	Nietzsche	would	then	have	to	take	Freud’s	line	that	the	need	for	Sinn	cannot	be	taken	with	philosophical	seriousness,	and	his	practical	philosophy	would	crumble.”	(Gardner,	28)		
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person	theoretical	perspective.		It	thus	makes	sense	to	interpret	Nietzsche	as	holding	
(First	Person)	and	(Practical).		IV.	Activity	in	Nietzsche		 In	 this	 section,	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 a	 series	 of	 related	 questions	 that	may	 lead	 us	 to	reject	 interpreting	 Nietzsche	 along	 the	 self-constitution	 view.	 	 Is	 the	 notion	 of	 self-creation	 or	 self-constitution	 contradictory?	 	 Does	 it	 emphasize	 conscious	 reasoning,	which	 Nietzsche	 often	 de-emphasizes?	 	 Does	 it	 require	 a	 free	 self	 of	 the	 kind	 that	Nietzsche	rejects?	In	what	follows,	I	will	discuss	some	ways	of	answering	these	questions	such	 that	 they	 do	 not	 present	 a	 problem	 for	 interpreting	Nietzsche	 as	 providing	 a	 self-constitution	view.		 One	 feature	 of	 the	 self-constitution	 view	 is	 (Active),	 that	 one	 be	 active	 in	constituting	the	self.		One	may	wonder	how	it	is	possible	to	be	active	if	one	is	not	already	there,	 that	 there	 is	 something	 contradictory	about	a	 self	 that	 is	 active	 in	 creating	 itself.		Korsgaard	 and	 Schechtman	 both	 embrace	 this	 notion	 that	 the	 self	 is	 actively	 created.		Korsgaard	says,	“what	it	is	to	be	a	person,	or	a	rational	agent,	is	just	to	be	engaged	in	the	
activity	of	constantly	making	yourself	into	a	person…”57		Korsgaard	directly	addresses	the	possibility	that	there	be	something	contradictory	or	circular	in	the	self-constitution	view	but	 she	 argues	 that	 “being	 a	 person,	 like	 being	 a	 living	 thing,	 is	 being	 engaged	 in	 an	activity	of	self-constitution.”58		She	argues	“that	in	the	relevant	sense	there	is	no	you	prior	to	your	choices	and	actions,	because	your	identity	is	in	a	quite	literal	way	constituted	by	
																																																								57	Korsgaard,	42,	emphasis	added.	58	Korsgaard,	42.	
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your	choices	and	actions.”59	For	Korsgaard,	 the	self	 is	constituted	through	action	so	that	as	we	act,	we	are	at	the	same	time	constituting	the	self.		It	is	key	to	her	view	that	the	self	be	active	 for	 there	to	be	action	at	all.	 	Though	there	 is	an	 interdependency	between	the	notions	 of	 action	 and	 having	 an	 agent,	 the	 view	 need	 not	 be	 circular.	 	 Activity	 is	 what	makes	us	into	agents	and	agents	are	those	engaged	in	certain	type	of	activity.		 Schechtman	also	believes	that	the	self	needs	to	be	active	in	self-constitution.			She	says	 that	 a	 self-constituting	 narrative	 “is	 not	 simply	 a	 static	 set	 of	 facts	 about	 him,	 but	rather	a	dynamic	set	of	organizing	principles,	a	basic	orientation	through	which,	with	or	without	 conscious	 awareness,	 an	 individual	 understands	 himself	 and	 his	 world.”	 60	Schechtman	emphasizes	that	the	self	be	active	in	creating	a	narrative,	even	though	not	all	aspects	 of	 this	 narrative	 need	 to	 be	 fully	 conscious.	 	 The	 self-constitution	 view	 is	compatible	with	a	view	of	the	mind,	like	Nietzsche’s,	that	emphasizes	mental	states	that	are	not	conscious.		Some	of	the	organizing	principles	and	narrative	may	be	unconscious.				 While	Korsgaard	and	Schechtman	may	have	differing	views	of	what	it	means	to	be	active	 in	self-constitution,	 I	believe	this	notion	could	be	 filled	out	 in	a	way	that	 fits	well	with	 Nietzsche’s	 views.	 	 Just	 to	 point	 to	 an	 example,	 in	 Agency	 and	 the	 Foundations	 of	
Ethics,	 Katsafanas	 provides	 a	Nietzschean	 account	 of	 activity.	 	 For	my	purposes	 here,	 I	want	to	note	that	Katsafanas’	account	provides	an	example	of	what	an	account	of	activity	could	 look	 like	 such	 that	 it:	 (i)	 fits	 with	 Nietzsche’s	 views,	 (ii)	 fits	 with	 the	 self-constitution	account,	(iii)	is	not	circular	or	contradictory.			
																																																								59	Korsgaard,	Self-Constitution,	19.	60	Schechtman,	116.	
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Katsafanas’	 account	of	 activity	 is	broadly	 compatibilist	 and	“does	not	 rely	on	 the	discredited	 claims	about	agency.”61		On	Katsafanas’	 account,	whether	 the	agent	 is	 active	depends	on	whether	the	agent	approves	of	her	action	and	whether	this	approval	would	be	undermined	with	more	knowledge	of	the	motivation	behind	the	action.		He	says,	“an	agent	is	active	iff	two	conditions	are	met:	(i)	the	agent	approves	of	her	action,	and	(ii)	further	knowledge	of	the	motives	figuring	in	the	etiology	of	this	action	would	not	undermine	her	approval	of	the	action.”62		This	account	coheres	well	with	Nietzsche’s	claims	that	the	true	motives	behind	our	actions	are	often	unknown,	as	it	does	not	require	that	the	agent	know	the	motives	behind	her	 actions	 for	 her	 to	 be	 active.	 Katsafanas	 points	 out	 that	 “we	 are	 examining	 a	counterfactual	–	in	which	the	agent	has	more	information	about	the	etiology	of	his	action	–	and	asking	whether	the	agent’s	approval	of	the	action	then	dissipates.”63			Though	one	may	think	that	 the	self-constitution	view	requires	transparency,	 that	one	 knows	 everything	 about	 the	 self,	 this	 account	 can	 allow	 for	 activity	 without	 such	transparency.	 	Schechtman	directly	addresses	the	issue	of	transparency	in	connection	to	her	 self-constitution	account	and	denies	 that	 transparency	 is	needed.	 	On	Schechtman’s	view,	the	self-constituting	narrative	need	not	be	articulated	or	explicit	(one	need	not	walk	around	telling	oneself	 the	story	of	one’s	 life)	nor	need	 it	be	 fully	conscious.64		Similarly,																																																									61	Katsafanas,	143	62	Katsafanas,	111.	63	Katsafanas,	142.	64	On	this	point,	see	for	example:	“I	call	a	person’s	underlying	psychological	organization	a	self-narrative	because	it	is	not	simply	a	static	set	of	facts	about	him,	but	rather	a	dynamic	set	of	organizing	principles,	a	basic	orientation	through	which,	with	or	without	conscious	awareness,	an	individual	understands	himself	and	his	world.		These	implicit	organizing	principles	are	not	simply	a	collection	of	features,	but	a	continually	developing	interpretation	of	the	course	of	one’s	trajectory	through	the	world.		In	this	way	it	is	
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attributing	to	Nietzsche	a	self-constitution	account	would	not	require	that	we	attribute	to	him	 a	 view	 of	 the	 mind	 as	 fully	 transparent.	 Indeed,	 the	 self-constitution	 view	 is	compatible	with	Nietzsche’s	views	that	we	are	often	ignorant	of	our	own	minds.65			As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 this	 section,	 we	 can	 respond	 to	 various	 objections	 to	interpreting	 Nietzsche	 along	 the	 self-constitution	 view.	 	 The	 view	 need	 not	 be	contradictory	and	 it	need	not	 require	a	picture	of	 the	mind	as	 transparent	or	a	view	of	freedom	that	is	incompatible	with	Nietzsche’s	rejection	of	metaphysical	free	will.		Some	of	these	questions	may	seem	to	present	a	problem	for	attributing	to	Nietzsche	a	version	of	the	 self-constitution	 view.	 	 But	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 we	 may	 be	 able	 to	 answer	 these	questions	in	ways	that	are	compatible	with	Nietzsche’s	claims.		Conclusion	There	 are	 many	 advantages	 to	 interpreting	 Nietzsche’s	 as	 holding	 a	 type	 of	 self-constitution	account.		It	allows	us	to	make	sense	of	many	claims	by	Nietzsche	that	would	otherwise	 seem	 contradictory.	 	 This	 kind	 of	 interpretation	 coheres	 with	 many	 of	 his	remarks	about	self-creation	and	can	make	sense	of	his	practical	philosophy.		In	addition,	the	many	naturalistic	and	anti-metaphysical	remarks	made	by	Nietzsche	fit	well	with	this	kind	of	view	and	are	not	really	 in	opposition	with	 it,	 as	 long	as	 they	are	understood	as	theoretical	 claims	 that	do	not	undermine	 the	 importance	of	 the	practical	point	of	 view.																																																																																																																																																																																		legitimate	to	think	of	what	I	am	calling	the	implicit	self-narrative	as	a	self-conception,	even	though	it	contains	elements	that	the	person	explicitly	denies.”	(Schechtman,	116)	65	For	an	example	of	Nietzsche’s	emphasis	on	the	unconscious,	see:	“We	could	think,	feel,	will,	remember,	and	also	‘act’	in	every	sense	of	the	term,	and	yet	none	of	this	would	have	to	‘enter	our	consciousness’	(as	one	says	figuratively).		All	of	life	would	be	possible		without,	as	it	were,	seeing	itself	in	a	mirror;	and	still	today,	the	predominant	part	of	our	lives	actually	unfolds	without	this	mirroring—of	course	including	our	thinking,	willing,	and	feeling	lives...”	(GS	354)	
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